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On being good gay: ‘covering’ and the social
structure of being LGBT+
Annamari Vitikainen
Department of Philosophy, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway
ABSTRACT
This essay discusses Cyril Ghosh’s analysis of the notion of ‘gay covering’ as an
act of downplaying one’s gayness in the face of public expectations, and its
countermove of ‘reversing cover’. I acknowledge, along with Ghosh, that both
the demands to ‘cover’ and ‘reverse cover’ are problematic from the perspective
of LGBT+ authenticity. I aim to show, however, that such acts of covering, and
reversing cover, are borne from complex social relations that involve (often
conflicting) expectations, self-identifications, and modes of being treated as.
This social structure of what it is to be ‘gay’may help explain, not only why such
demands to cover, and reverse cover, are problematic, but also why, in the
world we live in, the harm and oppression of the two demands are very
different.
KEYWORDS Covering; LGBT+; social identity; expectations; self-identification; being treated as;
oppression
‘Gay covering’, in line with Yoshino’s (2002, 2006) work, refers to the acts of
gay persons to disattend or tone down their sexuality in order to fit better (or
easier) into the mainstream society. The demands of gay persons to ‘cover’
are recognized, both by Yoshino and by Ghosh (2018), as constituting
a system oppression by which LGBT+1 persons are coerced to act in certain
ways, with substantive threats of punishment for failing to do so. For Ghosh,
these demands to cover are not, however, the only oppressive demands that
LGBT+ persons are subjected to. To the contrary, Ghosh argues that Yoshino’s
critique of covering incorporates another demand on LGBT+ persons, this
time to ‘reverse cover’ – to flaunt and signal – that, according to Ghosh, is ‘just
as oppressive as the oppression it is mobilized to dismantle’ (p. 73).
Ghosh’s critique of Yoshino’s work is grounded on an observation that
‘being gay’ may be multiply manifested. As Ghosh rightly recognizes, not all
gays who would seem to be covering are in fact doing so, but may simply be
trying to be themselves. Ghosh criticizes Yoshino for falling into essentialist
notions of what it (really) is to be (a good) gay. In Yoshino’s work, the
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stereotypical dichotomies of straight vs. gay (e.g. heterosexual monogamous
relationships vs. gay promiscuity, gender typical vs. gender atypical presenta-
tions, interest in straight vs. gay culture) are used, not only to illustrate the
hidden assaults on gays to cover, but incorporate a deeper, and more
problematic, meaning of what it is to be gay. For Yoshino, homosexuals can
decide how gay they choose to be (Yoshino, 2006, p. 79; Ghosh, 2018, p. 86)
that incorporates another hidden assault on LGBT+ persons: a demand to
reverse cover – to act more gay – that, according to Ghosh, is just as
oppressive as the initial demand to cover that Yoshino so forcefully criticizes.
In this essay, I do not challenge Ghosh’s reading of Yoshino’s work in
regards to its essentialist tendencies or underlying injunction to reverse
cover. Rather, I develop a more systematic analysis of why, given the com-
plexities of how our social identities are produced, both the demands to
cover and reverse cover are problematic. By way of such analysis I proceed to
show why Ghosh is ultimately wrong in equating the oppressiveness of the
two demands, and why, more controversially, some such demands may be
acceptable.
The structure of social identities
Following Kwame Appiah’s (2005, pp. 65–71) work on the structure of social
identities, we can understand social identities, such as ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘trans’,
but also ‘black’, ‘woman’, ‘philosopher’, etc., as referring to the kinds of
persons that are brought about simultaneously by the creation of a label for
them. Social identities, e.g. ‘gay’, incorporate three elements: (1) There must
be a social conception of a label, ‘gay’, and a relatively common acceptance
that it makes sense to categorize some people under this label. This social
conception includes certain ideas and expectations of what it is to be ‘gay’,
although the contents of these expectations may be contested. (2) There
must also be some persons who self-identify as ‘gay’, and let this identifica-
tion operate as (a partial) reason for their behavior. (3) There must also be
occasions when some people are treated as ‘gay’.
Importantly, there may be discrepancies both in the demarcation of the
group of persons who are categorized as ‘gay’, and in the contents of the
expectations and modes of behavior that are expected of ‘gays’. Some self-
identified gays may not always be recognized as gays by others (e.g. homo-
sexuals who are, for whatever reasons, hiding their being gay), and some non-
identified gays may also be misrecognized as gay (e.g. bisexuals who are
judged to be either gay or straight depending on their present partner). The
issues of group demarcation aside, the contents of expectations towards
‘gays’ may also differ, both among self-identifiers and others. This is where
the ‘being themselves – critique’ (cf. Ghosh pp. 76–77) draws its force. For
some self-identified gays, what it means to be gay – how they view their
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authentic selves to be – may be manifested precisely by establishing
a traditional partnership and an (at least relatively) frictionless engagement
in the mainstream society. For other self-identifiers, being gay may be far
more subversive, challenging many of the traditional expectations and con-
ventions around intimacy, partnership and social engagement. For them,
their authentic selves would, no doubt, be covered should they have to
conform to these expectations, or to tone down the ways in which their
sexuality is expressed. Importantly, for both groups of self-identifiers, their
views of what it is to be gay may simply be reflections of the kinds of persons
they themselves are, rather than instances of trying to cover or, for that
matter, reverse cover.
It should thus be clear that, from the perspective of LGBT+ authenticity, any
univocal demands to either cover or reverse cover are problematic. As Ghosh
and Yoshino agree, the cultural, as well as legal, norms on gays to cover – to
hide or tone down some aspects of their sexuality – are both harmful and
unjust. Anyone, whether gay or straight, should be able to express their
sexuality2 and be their authentic selves without this engendering an unjustified
burden, social stigma or disadvantage for them. However, as Ghosh carefully
points out, the countering demands for gays to reverse cover – to signal and
flaunt –may also be harmful, as for some gays, such signaling or flaunting is not
at all part of who they are. Here, I believe, lies the crux of Ghosh’s critique of
Yoshino’s work. While Yoshino never explicitly claims that those gays who do
not signal or flaunt would necessarily be covering, Ghosh nevertheless argues
that Yoshino’s criticism is based on a tactic that shames anyone who does not
signal or flaunt. Recall that, for Yoshino, homosexuals can decide how gay they
choose to be, thus incorporating another normative notion of what it really is to
be gay. In effect, Yoshino imposes an opposite demand on gays to reverse
cover – to signal and flaunt – regardless of whether those persons refraining
from signaling are, in fact, aiming to cover, or simply being their authentic
selves.
Demanding to ‘cover’ and ‘reverse cover’ – a false equation
So far, the threefold structure of social identities has helped us understand
why, from the perspective of LGBT+ authenticity, any univocal demands to
cover or reverse cover are problematic. To demand a flaunting homosexual to
tone down (cover) or a more traditionalist gay to camp up (reverse cover), is
to ask them to be something they are not. These demands are, of course, also
connected to the kinds of expectations that others may have for recognizing
any particular person as gay – thus also explaining why, at times, people may
be misrecognized as gay (or not gay).
But are these two conflicting demands (to cover and reverse cover) equally
oppressive, as Ghosh claims them to be? In order to answer this question, we
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need a working definition of oppression. Unfortunately, Ghosh never pro-
vides such definition, thus making his claims about the oppressiveness of the
two demands difficult to assess. For our present purposes, let us nevertheless
adopt the following working definition: Oppression refers to a relatively
broad, institutionalized system of disadvantage that inflicts unjust harm to
members of the oppressed group (Cf. e.g. Cudd, 2005). This working defini-
tion aims to capture something both about the consequences of oppression
(group-based unjust harm), and about its scope, being embedded in a variety
of social institutions, including, although not necessarily so, formal state
institutions (e.g. the court system).
In the light of this definition, there are two ways to understand the
oppressiveness of the two demands. On the one hand, we can think of
both demands as part of a broader system of oppression by being two
instances of sexuality-based policing of gays. Being contradictory, the two
demands create impossible expectations of gays who – in order to be ‘good
gays’ – would now need to simultaneously both cover and signal their
sexuality. According to this understanding, Yoshino’s injunction to reverse
cover can be seen as being part of the already existing system of oppression
that subjects gays to harmful, coercive, and often untenable expectations of
how they should act and behave.
But this is not what Ghosh seems to have in mind when he critiques
Yoshino’s work for being ‘just as oppressive as the oppression it is mobilized
to dismantle’. For Ghosh, Yoshino’s injunction is not only part of the broader
system of oppression against gays, but constitutes a different, alternative,
mode of oppression that gays are now subjected to. As such, the oppressive-
ness of the two demands needs to be assessed differently. Drawing from our
working definition, we can now think of the two demands separately, and
assess the extent to which each demand correlates with the two above-
mentioned elements of oppression: its broadness/institutional embedded-
ness, and the consequences/harm inflicted.
In order to do so, let us again return to the threefold structure of social
identities, and the third element of being treated as ‘gay’. Recall that the first
element – a social conception of a label ‘gay’ – already incorporates ideas
and expectations of what it is to be ‘gay’. These ideas, however, not only
provide us with cues for categorizing persons under the label ‘gay’, they
also operate as reasons to act and behave in certain manners, both as gays
and towards gays. For example, should I recognize you to be gay, I may let
this operate as a (partial) reason for inviting you to my next queer dinner
party, for introducing you to my attractive gay single friend or, should
things be less joyful, for helping you out in your court case against sexual
orientation-based employment discrimination. In short, I let my knowledge
of you being gay operate as a reason for treating you in a certain way – for
treating you as gay.
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Such treatment as may, of course, be both positive and negative, and
operate on both personal and institutional levels. Me inviting (or failing to
invite) you to my next dinner party may not, however, say much about the
possible system of oppression that you, as a gay person, are subjected to,
while the existence of your court case against sexual orientation-based
employment discrimination may already provide us with some cues about
it. Recall that oppression refers to a relatively broad, institutionalized system
of disadvantage that inflicts unjust harm on members of the oppressed
group. And while one’s personal actions – prejudices, biases etc. – may not
be entirely separated from any particular system of oppression, for such
a system to occur, these actions need to be sufficiently widespread, grounded
in social and (possibly) legal institutions, and have substantive, harmful and
unjust consequences.
Let us now assess the two demands (to cover and reverse cover) in light of
(1) the broadness and institutional embeddedness of each demand, and (2)
the kinds of consequences (the harm inflicted) on those affected. As Yoshino
goes into great lengths to demonstrate, there have been, and still are, wide-
spread cultural expectations for gays to cover.3 These range from common
everyday expectations (e.g. to refrain from showing same-sex affection in
public) to more specific instances (e.g. to not write about LGBT+ issues while
striving for tenure in academia), with potentially substantive consequences
for failing to comply (threat of violence; lack of tenure). On occasions, these
expectations are also manifested in legal contexts. Yoshino provides exam-
ples from child custody and civil service employment cases (Yoshino, 2002,
pp. 851–863). In these cases, one’s failure to cover – to tone down, be more
discreet about one’s sexuality – has resulted in losing custody or losing
employment. Notably, in these cases, the relevant treatment as does not
only refer to one being treated as gay, but to a notably differentiated treat-
ment depending on what kind of gay one is (or is perceived to be).
Compliance with the demands to cover (to be ‘a good gay’) is rewarded,
while the failure to do so (to be ‘a bad gay’) is punished. The widespread
social expectations for gays to cover are transferred into coercive, response-
rewarding treatment that further reinforce our ideas of how it is ‘appropriate’
for gays to act and behave: to be ‘good gays’.
The same, however, does not apply to the opposite demands to reverse
cover – at least not to the same extent as in the case of demands to cover.
While Yoshino gives a number of social, as well as institutionalized and legal
examples of the demands to cover, Ghosh’s examples of the opposite are
largely restricted to Yoshino’s work: how Yoshino’s critique of covering
incorporates an injunction to reverse cover. This is not to say that there
could not be (more) such examples. Some gays may well be subjected to
social pressures to signal and flaunt (e.g. from within LGBT+ community), be
socially sanctioned for not doing so, or be subjected to a number of (no doubt
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annoying, even disrespectful) questions and comments about their ‘see-
mingly straight’ behavior. But these injunctions to reverse cover are typically
not transferred to broad cultural, institutionalized or legal demands, nor do
they thus entail sanctions that would be on par with the sanctions for failing
to cover. To put it bluntly: while many gays may have lost their jobs for failing
to cover, not many have lost their jobs for failing to flaunt.4 These two issues –
the broadness/institutional embeddedness, and the level of sanctions for
failing to comply – I believe, make Ghosh’s claims about the equal oppres-
siveness of the two demands ultimately misguided.
It is, however, one thing to say that Ghosh is wrong to equate the oppres-
siveness of the two demands, and another to suggest that the latter demands
to reverse cover – to flaunt and signal – might sometimes be acceptable.
While I cannot develop a thorough argument to such effect here, I wish to
end this essay by pointing towards such possibility by focusing on the
differentiated consequences5 of the two demands on the opportunities of
LGBT+ persons to be their authentic selves.
Take, first, the widespread cultural, social and (at times) legal demands on
gays to cover. As demonstrated by Yoshino, and agreed to by Ghosh, these
demands are harmful and oppressive, and have especially acute negative
consequences on those gays who fail to comply. While such demands no
doubt apply to all gays (whether ‘flaunting’ or ‘traditionalist’), the concrete
effects of such demands on the ‘traditionalists’ are far more subtle. After all,
their being themselves already aligns with the existing norms and expecta-
tions of how ‘good gays’ are supposed to act and behave, as these demands
are the norm – the status quo – of the contemporary society. In the world that
we live in, not (much) is gained, or lost, for the ‘traditionalist gays’ from such
demands that, in effect, ask them to be their authentic selves.
A very different picture, however, would seem to occur with the ‘injunction
to reverse cover’. While one needs not deny the potential harm done unto
those (in this case, ‘traditionalists’) for having to face such demands to flaunt
and signal, these harms, as I have tried to show, are relatively minor in
comparison to the extent and magnitude of the harm done unto those who
fail to cover. On the other hand, there is a lot that could potentially be gained
from such demands to reverse cover, in a society where being ‘a good gay’ is
predominantly understood in traditionalist terms. For such demands to
reverse cover – to flaunt and signal – are set to shake the status quo and,
by doing so, open up the possibility also for the ‘flaunting gays’ to be their
authentic selves without the commonly attached stigma and fear of punish-
ment for doing so.
In sum, while I do not wish to critique Ghosh for highlighting some of the
problems and potential harms of Yoshino’s ‘injunction to reverse cover’,
I nevertheless hope to have shown two things. First, there are important
asymmetries between the conflicting demands to cover and reverse cover
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that make Ghosh’s claims about them being equally oppressive ultimately
misguided. Second, and more tentatively, when looking at the actual con-
sequences – the potential harms and benefits of the two demands in the
world that we live in – the balance of scales may just turn out to be such as to
make such injunction to reverse cover, while not entirely unproblematic,
nevertheless as catering, rather than constraining, the opportunities of
LGBT+ persons to be their authentic selves.
Notes
1. I follow Ghosh in using the term LGBT+ as an inclusive umbrella term for
a variety of non-heterosexual orientations and non-conforming gender identi-
fications. Many of the examples, as well as the generic language of this essay,
nevertheless refer to gay males, although I see no reason why some of the same
issues could not also apply to the other subcategories of LGBT+.
2. Not all expressions of sexuality, e.g. by way of unwanted sexual advancements
or sexual harassment should, of course, be allowed, although this applies
regardless of one’s sexual orientation or gender identity.
3. As my focus here is on ‘covering’, I leave the other possible – and historically
also prevalent – demands to ‘convert’ and ‘pass’ aside.
4. The same, arguably, applies to the two other examples mentioned above: while
many gays have been beaten up for showing affection in public, not many have
been beaten for not doing so; and while refraining fromwriting on LGBT+ issues
may be detrimental to those applying for tenure in e.g. Queer Studies, I’d
suspect the opposite to be more commonly true in areas where LGBT+ issues
constitute a legitimate yet marginalized topic of research.
5. My focus on consequences follows that of Ghosh’s (and Yoshino’s) focus on the
potentially harmful effects of such demands.
Acknowledgments
Thank you to the participants of Civic Constellations workshop in Cadiz and GMR
workshop in Tromsø, and to Patti Tamara Lenard, Tamara Metz, and Melina Duarte
for useful comments and criticisms on earlier versions of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work has been supported by the Globalizing Minority Rights project, Norwegian
Research Council, grant no. 259017.
CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 7
Notes on contributor
Annamari Vitikainen is associate professor of philosophy at UiT – The Arctic University
of Norway. She is the author of The Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism (Palgrave, 2015).
Her research interest include those related to multiculturalism, migration, minority
rights, and sexuality and gender.
References
Appiah, K. A. (2005). The ethics of identity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cudd, A. (2005). How to explain oppression: Criteria of adequacy for normative
explanatory theories. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 35, 20–49.
Ghosh, C. (2018). De-moralizing gay rights: Some queer remarks on LGBT+ rights politics
in the US. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, Palgrave Pivot.
Yoshino, K. (2002). Covering. The Yale Law Journal, 111, 769–939.
Yoshino, K. (2006). Covering: The hidden assault on our civil rights. New York: Random
House Trade Paperpacks.
8 A. VITIKAINEN
